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Manifest Illusions
A Reply to Axel Kohler
Heiko Hecht
The notion of illusion as a discrepancy between physical stimulus and percept
(here referred to as illusiond, as long as merely this “error” is meant) is unable to
capture the four very different cases in which illusions can arise. The observer
may or may not be aware of the discrepancy, and its magnitude may be large or
small. I argue that the special case of small error paired with awareness deserves
special attention. Only in this case does the observer readily see the illusion,
since it becomes manifest (referred to as illusionm). Illusionm is a meaningful cat-
egory even in cases where illusiond  cannot be determined. Illusionsm of apparent
motion and illusions of intuitive physics are solicited.
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1 The concept of illusion
Axel  Kohler  points  out  that  illusions  under-
stood as discrepancy between physical stimulus
and percept (illusiond) have inspired progress in
the history of experimental psychology. At first
glance, this seems to be rather obvious. How-
ever, to define a discrepancy, one must have two
comparable  measures  of  the  same  thing.  But
this is often not the case.  Take a given lamp
that looks very dim to us during the day but
blindingly  bright  at  night.  How bright  is  the
stimulus  really?  We  are  unable  to  determine
which of  the two cases  is  more illusoryd.  The
perceiver does not normally notice the illusiond.
Apparent motion, in contrast, which has been a
very influential paradigm, is more than mere il-
lusiond. By differentiating illusions into illusiond
and illusionm, I am able to point out a strange
inconsistency between the amount of error con-
tained  in  an  illusion  and the  perceptual  con-
spicuity of this error. I argue that there are four
varieties of discrepancy between physical stimu-
lus and the related percept (illusiond). They can
be grouped by the size of the discrepancy and
the degree of  awareness  (see Figure  1).  First,
there are more or less subtle discrepancies that
are  ubiquitous  and go  unnoticed  most  of  the
time. In rare occasions, and usually triggered by
a revealing piece of contradiction, they are no-
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ticed (illusionm). The second variety consists of
very large discrepancies, such as found in many
intuitive physics examples. For instance, a water
surface  may  look  fine  even  if  it  extends  im-
possibly at  a  large angle  from the horizontal.
For instance, when asked to draw the surface
level that water assumes in a tilted beaker, ob-
servers err as if they did not know that water
remains parallel to the ground. And the more
expert they become at avoiding spills, the larger
the error becomes. Experienced bartenders pro-
duce  the  largest  errors  (see  Hecht &  Proffitt
1995).  The  perception  of  relational  properties
discussed in the target article falls into this cat-
egory. Here the perceptual error can be enorm-
ous and still go unnoticed. Typically, we need to
consult physics books and learn about a phys-
ical stimulus before we are convinced that our
perception is erroneous. When conceiving of il-
lusion  as  mere  illusiond,  we  fail  to  honor  the
special case of illusionm.  Illusionsd are ubiquit-
ous. As a matter of fact, the core discipline of
sensory  psychology—psychophysics—can  be
thought of as the formal description of how a
physical  stimulus  differs  from  its  percept.  It
does  so  all  the  time.  Illusionsm are  a  special
case. They may warn the organism about where
adjustments to the perceptual system are neces-
sary  in  order  to  avoid  potentially  dangerous
misjudgments.  Or they may just be occasions
where the perceptual  system fails  to  suppress
the perceptual process that has lost out in the
competition  to  resolve  the  underspecification
problem.
2 Apparent motion (AM)
I thank Axel Kohler for bringing up AM (ap-
parent motion) as an example of how seminal
an illusion can be for research. I do concur that
it  continues  to  be  a  fascinating  phenomenon.
However,  I  believe that AM did not fascinate
Wertheimer (1912) because it is an illusiond, but
rather because it is predominantly an illusionm.
Note that the timing has to be just so (i.e., a
particular  combination  of  on-times  and  ISI,
inter-stimuli-intervals) in order to perceive what
he called phi-motion: perfectly smooth motion
practically  indistinguishable  from real  motion.
Most  of  his  experiments  and  demonstrations
have in  fact  worked with suboptimal  cases  in
which the perceived motion is bumpy or faint.
In  all  these  other  cases  of  AM,  the  illusory
nature  of  the  percept  becomes  manifest.  The
bistable quartet is another beautiful case of an
illusionm.  The mere fact  that  the percept can
flip at will shows the illusionm to be manifest.
Figure 1: Varieties of illusions.
As an aside, the Gestalt laws can be un-
derstood as an attempt to describe how the per-
cept emerges from the given physical stimulus.
But note that while the percept is always differ-
ent from the physical stimulus, it should not be
thought of as illusory just because it is the out-
come of  a  Gestalt  process.  When I  said  that
Gestalt psychologists have “avoided the term il-
lusion” I was not expecting anyone to count the
occurrences of  the term in Wertheimer’s  1912
paper. He did use the term. I stand corrected.
Note,  however,  that  he  put  the  term
“Täuschung” in quotation marks the first time
he used it, well aware that the phenomenal ex-
perience of motion is what makes the Gestalt,
regardless of how it relates to the physical stim-
ulus. 
Another  revealing  aspect  of  AM  is  its
power to reveal the extent to which world-know-
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ledge  is  factored  into  our  perception,  uncon-
sciously and the more so the less well-defined
the stimulus. Let us consider a classic AM-dis-
play in which two rectangles at two locations
and at  different  orientations are  shown in al-
ternation.  Whenever  the  ISI  is  short  (say
100ms),  we  see  one  rectangle  moving  on  a
straight path and changing its orientation con-
currently. If, however, the ISI is lengthened (to,
say, 500ms), then the AM-path curves (see Mc-
Beath & Shepard 1989; Hecht & Proffitt 1991).
The phenomenal quality of this motion is rather
ephemeral. We immediately see that the motion
is  not  distinct  but  fraught  with  uncertainty.
When  choosing  intermediate  ISI,  and  forcing
observers to make up their minds, some observ-
ers will see the rectangle curve and others will
see it move along a straight path. And when the
display  remains  unchanged  but  the  area
between the rectangles is shaded, then the rect-
angle appears to move along the shaded path.
Thus, one can direct the motion of the rectangle
along almost arbitrary paths (e.g.,  Shepard &
Zare 1983). Such demonstrations reveal that the
very  notion  of  error  or  discrepancy  between
physical stimulus and percept becomes shaky. It
seems rather  arbitrary  whether  the  researcher
considers only the rectangles to be the relevant
stimulus or also considers the background to be
part of the stimulus. In these AM displays, the
visual system appears to make sense of the en-
tire display, not just the two moving rectangles.
3 The case for illusionm 
Such resolution of the underspecification prob-
lem  can  even  annihilate  an  existing  illusiond.
Consider the sophisticated AM display we en-
counter when going to the movies. And let us
take the old-fashioned kind, where the projec-
tion screen is black most of the time, only inter-
rupted 24 times a second by a very brief flash of
a  stationary  picture.  Smooth  motion  is  per-
ceived. Here, the observer is typically unaware
of the illusiond, but what is perceived is actually
closer to the original scene than to the movie
that was made from it. We might even entertain
the idea that there is no illusiond, since the per-
cept is very close to the original scene that was
filmed.  Now, calling apparent  motion illusoryd
when dealing with artificial or computer-gener-
ated stimuli, but veridical when dealing with a
movie, does not seem to make much sense. This
is because, in a very deep sense, the visual sys-
tem has no way of distinguishing between ac-
tual  motion  and  snapshot  motion.  The  hard-
ware we use to detect motion is built such that
it  is  unable  to  differentiate  between  the  two.
Basically,  the  detector  for  motion  is  designed
such that successive excitations of the receptive
fields  of  two motion-sensitive  neurons  lead  to
the impression of motion. These Reichardt/Has-
senstein  detectors  (Hassenstein &  Reichardt
1956) are discrete; they cannot tell the differ-
ence between continuous and stroboscopic mo-
tion (see e.g., Hecht 2006). Note that this holds
for phi-motion but falls apart when ISI or duty
cycle are changed.
Figure 2:  Simultaneous color contrast: The orange and
the yellow squares are of the same respective color in the
panel on the left and on the right.
Let us now look at an example from the
color domain to further challenge the notion of
illusiond.  The  phenomenon  of  color  constancy
lets us perceive the same color even if the ambi-
ent lighting changes dramatically. We see an ob-
ject as blue regardless of whether the room is lit
by a neon light  or  by sunlight.  It  would not
make sense to call the percept of “blue” an illu-
siond under neon light when the ambient light-
ing is such that the object mainly reflects wave
lengths of say 500 nm and to call it veridical
when it is lit by sunlight such that the domin-
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ant wavelength is 450 nm. In both cases,  the
object  appears  blue.  We  cannot  determine  in
principle  which of  the  two cases  deserves  the
name illusiond, if any, or if both deserve to be
called illusiond. In contrast, when the two cases
are juxtaposed,  an illusionm  becomes manifest.
In Figure 2, the center inner square surrounded
by red on the left and the outer squares sur-
rounded  by  yellow  on  the  right  are  of  an
identical  color,  as becomes manifest  when oc-
cluding the surrounds. Thus, illusionm becomes
apparent, but illusiond cannot be defined in any
meaningful way.
4 Conclusion
In sum, the role of illusions in vision research
has historically been very important. The begin-
nings of experimental psychology have attemp-
ted to measure illusionsd in terms of the discrep-
ancy  or  error  between  physical  stimulus  and
percept. I have attempted to show that this er-
ror is neither substantial enough to serve as a
definition of illusion, nor particularly fascinat-
ing. Instead, illusionsd are as ubiquitous as they
are  typically  unnoticed  or  indeterminate.  In
contrast, the cases that engage our imagination
usually are manifest illusionsm. The latter can be
defined even in cases where it is not meaningful
to speak of illusiond. 
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